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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from the denial of her motion to terminate restitution imposed 
upon her guilty pleas to two counts of forgery, in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake 
County, the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding. This Court has jurisdiction over 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. In 1995 the trial court entered judgment, ordering that defendant pay restitution 
in an amount to be determined by Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P). In 1996, AP&P 
prepared and presented to defendant a document showing her obligation to pay restitution 
of $17,319.44. In 1997, defense counsel appeared at a probation review hearing. Neither 
defendant nor counsel filed an objection to the amount of restitution or requested a 
restitution hearing. Did defendant waive her right to challenge the restitution calculation 
by failing to timely challenge the amount or to timely request a restitution hearing? 
Standard of review. No standard of review applies. 
2. If defendant has not waived her right to challenge the 1995/1996 restitution 
order, was the original restitution order, including the$ 17,319.44 calculation, based on 
conduct for which defendant agreed to pay restitution as part of her plea agreement? 
3. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion when, in 2005, it denied 
defendant's 2004 motions to terminate restitution? 
Standard of Review. This Court "will not disturb a trial court's restitution order 
unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or [unless the court] otherwise abused its 
discretion." State v. Bickley, 2002 UT App 342 , \5 , 60 P.3d 582 (additional quotation 
marks and citation omitted). However, the Court will "review a trial court's 
interpretation of restitution statutes for correctness." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statute is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with two counts of forgery, a third degree 
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (West 2004), and with three counts of 
possession of a forged check, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-502 (West 2004). R3-6; see also District Court Docket (951901411), attached as 
Addendum B. On October 30, 1995, defendant pled guilty to the two forgery counts. 
R40-41. The State agreed to dismiss the three misdemeanor counts. Id. The State 
agreed to dismiss two other cases. R32. One of the dismissed cases (951901412) 
charged forgery and theft by receiving stolen property. See District Court Docket 
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(951901412), attached as Addendum C. The other dismissed case (951901413) charged 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. See District 
Court Docket (951901413), attached as Addendum D. The State further agreed not to 
file additional charges on criminal activity prior to July 13, 1995. R32. In exchange, 
defendant "agree[d] to restitution on all cases." Id. 
On December 11,1995, the district court imposed judgment. R45. The court 
ordered defendant to serve a prison term of zero to five years and to pay a fine of $5000. 
Id. The court granted a stay of the prison sentence and fine and placed defendant on 
probation for 36 months, pursuant to various conditions. Id. As one of the conditions, 
the court ordered that defendant pay restitution in an amount to be determined by AP&P. 
R46. 
On April 25, 1996, AP&P filed a progress/violation report. R48. The report 
indicated that defendant had been placed on probation on December 11, 1995, and 
ordered to pay restitution "in an amount to be determined." Id. After later receiving a 
letter and documentation from Smith's grocery stores, AP&P calculated restitution at 
$17,319.44. R152. On October 17, 1996, AP&P agent Glade Anderson, defendant5s 
probation officer, informed defendant of the amount. R152; see also R171:16. 
Defendant told him that she believed that the amount was excessive. R152. He advised 
her "to contact her attorney and attempt to settle the amount through a hearing." 
R171:16; see also R152. 
Almost a year later, on August 11, 1997, the trial court held a probation review 
hearing. R65. Defense counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, appeared. Id. At this hearing, the 
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court ordered that, although defendant was living in Idaho, AP&P, rather than Idaho 
authorities, supervise her probation. Id. Defense counsel did not raise the issue of 
restitution, challenge the amount, or request a restitution hearing. See id. 
On December 15, 1997, AP&P filed another progress/violation report. R66. The 
document listed the conditions of defendant's "thirty-six months of supervised 
probation," including the requirement that she [p]ay restitution in the amount of 
$17,319.44. R66. AP&P noted that the court had ordered defendant to continue 
restitution and had ordered AP&P to continue supervision. R66-67. AP&P indicated that 
defendant's living in Idaho was "a violation of the interstate compact agreement" and 
was "causing some problems." R67. AP&P therefore recommended that "due to the 
Defendant's compliance in this case, the restitution be transferred to a civil judgement 
and Adult Probation and Parole successfully terminate their interest." R67. Below the 
recommendation, the document carried a form that allowed the trial court judge to 
approve and order the recommended action or to deny it. Id. The trial judge signed the 
approval and order on December 15, 1997. Id. 
The next item in the record is a letter from defendant to the district court judge, 
filed May 13, 1999, in which defendant stated that as of February 1999 she owed 
$16,014.14. R68. Defendant, complained, however, that "GC Services, a collection 
agency from the state," had been adding interest and fees to her account and that, despite 
her payments, she now owed $19,897.12. R68-69. She asked the judge to "recall [her] 
restitution account." R69. 
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On June 11, 1999, the court held a hearing on the matter and granted defendant's 
motion "that restitution be returned from collections and be monit[o]red by AP&P." 
R73. The court also ordered that defendant "pay the restitution before paying the balance 
of the Court fine." R74. On July 20, 1999, the court rescinded that order, stating that 
"[a]fter further examination, the Court is unable to retake supervision of further fine 
payments. Supervision will remain with GC services." R75. A copy of the order was 
sent to defendant at her Idaho address and to her attorney at his Salt Lake City address. 
R76. 
The next entry in the record is defendant's June 29, 2004 pro se motion to 
terminate restitution. R77. The State opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, 
that "the restitution in this case has been sent to the State Office of Debt Collections and 
the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the matter." R87. On August 16, 2004, Ralph 
Dellapiana appeared for defendant at a hearing on the motion. R92. Defendant has not 
filed a transcript of that hearing. On September 10, 2004, Mr. Dellapiana filed an 
amended motion to terminate restitution. R94. On October 6, 2004, the trial court held 
another hearing on the motion. R143. Defendant has not filed a transcript of that 
hearing. At one of the two hearings, Judge Deno Himonas apparently ruled that the trial 
court had jurisdiction to hear defendant's motion and set the matter for hearing. See 
R171:46, 52. 
The case was then transferred to Judge John Paul Kennedy, who continued the 
matter and ordered counsel to obtain records from AP&P and State Debt Collections 
prior to the hearing. R145. At the January 26, 2005 hearing, the court took testimony, 
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reviewed records, and heard counsel's argument. See R171. The court found that 
defendant owed $16,014.14, but credited her with $4630 for amounts paid, leaving a 
balance owing of $11,384.14. R148. The court ordered her to pay that amount plus 
recoupment, but cancelled her fine. Id. The court ruled that defendant need not pay any 
interest if she paid at least $100 per month toward her restitution obligation, but that she 
would be required to pay interest if she paid at a lower rate. Id. The court ordered AP&P 
to monitor the payments, but ordered that the payments go to State Debt Collections. Id. 
The court instructed the prosecutor to prepare the order. Id. 
On February 7, 2005, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 
on defendant's motion to terminate. R151-57. The court denied the motion to terminate, 
but modified the restitution order to reflect a balance of $11,384.14. R155-56. 
Defendant timely appealed the denial of the motion to terminate. R158. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant presented forged checks to employees of Smith's Food King grocery 
stores. The forged checks included one purporting to be a payroll check issued by 
Clearwater Trucking and one purporting to be signed by Kandi Thurman, both payable to 
defendant. R5. She also possessed other checks purporting to be issued by Clearwater 
Trucking and payable to her. Id. Defendant, in fact, passed so many forged checks that 
Smith's returned checks department indicated "it would take them 'some time' to gather 
all of the information" relative to the losses defendant had caused Smith's. R47 (PSI) at 
4. Eventually, the losses defendant caused Smith's were calculated at $17,319.44, based 
on documentation from Smith's returned check department. R66, 152. The amount 
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included "$15,039.44 without service fees," apparently the value of forged checks 
defendant passed at Smith's, and "$17,319.44 when service fees were included." R152. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should deny defendant's challenge to the 1995 restitution order, 
including any claims that the order was improperly based on conduct for which defendant 
had not admitted responsibility or that the order was improperly calculated. Defendant 
waived her right to a restitution hearing and her right to challenge the amount of 
restitution when she did not timely request a hearing or file an objection. In any case, the 
1995 restitution order and its 1996 modification were properly based on both conduct for 
which defendant admitted responsibility and conduct for which she agreed to make 
restitution as part of her plea agreement. 
Further, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 2005 when it denied 
defendant's 2004 motions to terminate restitution. It cannot be said that no reasonable 
person would have taken the view taken by the trial court. Another jurist, in fact, might 
have entered a ruling far less favorable to defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant challenges both the trial court's 1995 restitution order and its 2005 
denial of her motions to terminate restitution. See Br. Appellant at 11, 16. 
Overview of restitution law. Utah law requires the imposition of restitution in an 
appropriate case. While the law has been amended since 1995, the amendments have not 
changed the basic mandate: "When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
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shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part 
of the plea agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (1995) (emphasis added); cf 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a) (West 2004). Criminal activities include "any offense 
of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the 
defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court " Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(l)(b) (1995); cf Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(b) (West 2004). Thus, a court may 
order restitution for (1) a defendant's conduct that resulted in conviction, (2) conduct for 
which the defendant admitted responsibility, and (3) conduct for which the defendant 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. 
A court is required to determine complete and court-ordered restitution. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1995); cf Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2) (West 2004) (Crime 
Victims Restitution Act). Complete restitution is "the restitution necessary to 
compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 
(4)(c)(i) (1995). Court-ordered restitution is "the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as part of the criminal sentence at the time of 
sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(c)(ii) (1995). In determining court-ordered 
restitution, a court must consider, in addition to the losses to the victim, the financial 
resources of the defendant, the burden that the payment of restitution will impose on the 
defendant, and the rehabilitative effect of the payment and method of payment. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (8)(c) (1995). 
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To aid the court in determining complete and court-ordered restitution, AP&P 
prepares a presentence investigation report (PSI). Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-20(5) (1995). 
The PSI should include a victim impact statement, identifying all the victims and 
itemizing their economic losses. Id. "If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, 
or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow [the 
defendant] a full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(e) (1995). If a 
defendant does not object to restitution or request a restitution hearing, she waives her 
right to a hearing. See State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, \ 10, 12 P.3d 110, ajf'd on 
different grounds, 2002 UT 98, 61 P.3d 1000; State v. Snyder, 1M P.2d 417, 421 (Utah 
1987) (holding that where Snyder "lodged no objection to the imposition, amount, or 
distribution of the restitution ordered" and did not "request a hearing on the issue," he 
"waived the right he had to challenge the order of restitution"). A trial court may enter a 
restitution order requiring restitution in an amount to be determined by AP&P. See, e.g., 
State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 393 (Utah App. 1994) (noting trial court's imposition of 
"restitution in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole"). 
A trial court has continuing jurisdiction to supervise its restitution orders. 
Statutory law grants the trial courts jurisdiction to enforce restitution in two ways: "as a 
probation condition" and "as a separate and independent component of the court's 
judgment and the defendant's original sentence." State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 211, ^ 9, 
11 P.3d 709; see also State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah App. 1992). The court 
may revoke or extend probation to enforce restitution. See Nones, 2000 UT App 211, ^ 
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13. The court may also hold a defendant in contempt for failure to comply with 
restitution orders. Id. The court's power to hold a non-complying defendant in contempt 
exists even where probation is not imposed and continues even when probation is 
terminated. Id. at ^ 12-13. 
As part of its ongoing power to supervise restitution, the trial court also has 
ongoing power to make appropriate modifications or clarifications of the restitution 
order. For instance, in State v. Allen, 2000 UT App 340, If 2, 15 P.3d 110, the trial court 
imposed judgment, ordering Allen to "serve 36 months probation and pay restitution to 
his victim for her counseling and associated costs." In October 1999, some three years 
later and after Allen's probation had been terminated, "the trial court held restitution 
review hearings at defendant's request to clarify its restitution order." Id. at f^ 4. The trial 
court imposed restitution to cover the victim's continued counseling, ordered Allen to 
pay the victim's medical and counseling bills through October 2000, and provided that 
the restitution order could be modified "upon a hearing should the victim require 
treatment past October 2000." Id. at Tf 15. 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE 
TO THE 1995/1996 RESTITUTION ORDER BECAUSE HER 
CHALLENGE IS UNTIMELY AND BECAUSE THE ORDER 
RESTED ON CONDUCT FOR WHICH DEFENDANT AGREED TO 
PAY RESTITUTION AS PART OF HER PLEA AGREEMENT 
Defendant claims that "the trial court exceeded its statutory authority by 
calculating court-ordered restitution based upon conduct for which [she] did not admit 
responsibility." Br. Appellant at 11. Defendant argues that "[i]n December 1995, the 
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trial court was limited by statute to order restitution based upon conduct for which [she] 
was either convicted or admitted responsibility." Id. 
Defendant thus challenges either the 1995 restitution order, which ordered 
restitution to be determined by AP&P, or its modification in 1996 when AP&P finally 
calculated and notified defendant of the amount. 
District court proceedings. As part of its December 11, 1995 judgment, the trial 
court ordered defendant to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by AP&P. 
R45-46. Defendant concedes in her brief that AP&P informed her of the amount 
approximately ten months after the sentencing hearing. See Br. Appellant at 14. Further, 
the trial court's findings at its hearing on defendant's motion to terminate restitution 
indicate that on October 17, 1996, AP&P agent Glade Anderson showed defendant an 
offender obligation form that "indicated restitution owing of $17,319.44." R152. 
Defendant does not dispute Agent Anderson's testimony that he advised her "to contact 
her attorney and attempt to settle the amount through a hearing." Rl 71:16. Despite 
notice of the amount calculated, defendant did not object, did not request a restitution 
hearing, and did not appeal. Neither did defense counsel file any objection or request a 
restitution hearing at that time or in 1997 when he appeared for a review hearing on 
defendant's probation. See R65. 
A. Defendant waived her right to a restitution hearing and her right to challenge 
the restitution amount. 
Defendant waived her right to a restitution hearing and her right to challenge the 
restitution amount. The restitution statute in effect in 1995 and 1996 provided: "If the 
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defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court 
shall at the time of sentencing allow [the defendant] a full hearing on the issue." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (1995); cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203(2)(c) (West 2004). 
Interpreting this language, which also appeared in the 1999 version of the statute, this 
Court held that a defendant who does not object to the recommended restitution amount 
or request a restitution hearing "at or before sentencing and [who] ha[s] no good cause 
not to make the request,... waivefs] his [or her] entitlement to a restitution hearing." 
Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, f 10; Snyder, 141 P.2d at 421. 
Defendant may have had good cause not to object to restitution or to request a 
restitution hearing when the trial court imposed restitution to be determined by AP&P. 
Once notified of the amount, however, defendant made no request for a restitution 
hearing, nor did she challenge the restitution amount until 2005. Defendant had the 
opportunity to do so in 1996 when AP&P informed her of the amount due and told her to 
contact her attorney about a hearing. She did not contact her attorney or the court, or, if 
she did contact her attorney, neither of them objected to the amount or requested a 
hearing. 
Defendant, in fact, did not request a restitution hearing or object to the amount of 
restitution for the next eight years. She did not object through counsel when, in 1997, he 
appeared for a review hearing on defendant's probation. While she did contact the court 
in 1999 to object to the accumulation of interest and fees, she did not, even then, request 
a restitution hearing or contest the amount of the restitution order. Defendant's failure at 
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every opportunity to alert the trial court to any concerns prevented the court from 
ordering a restitution hearing or addressing the restitution amount at an appropriate time. 
Defendant has not shown good cause for the approximately eight-year delay 
between the time restitution was fixed and her challenge to the restitution amount. Her 
failure to timely challenge the amount waived her right to challenge it eight years later or 
to object on the basis that in 2005 the prosecution could not produce all of the 
documentation underlying AP&P's 1996 restitution calculation. As the prosecutor 
argued below, it would be "unjust to have someone wait all these years . . . until it's 
difficult to establish exactly where the restitution came from, and then claim that she 
should be relieved of the fact of paying restitution." R171:51; see James v. Galetka, 965 
P.2d 567, 574 (Utah App. 1998) (noting that any error in considering restitution factors 
should have been brought to the immediate attention of the sentencing judge); Jackson v. 
State, 530 So.2d 900, 902 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988) (observing that objections should be 
made "as soon as the ground for the objection becomes apparent," when the court can 
remedy a problem without imposing severe sanctions, and that "a defendant should not be 
permitted to gain any advantage . . . by delay in filing objection"). 
B. The 1995 restitution order and its 1996 modification were proper. 
In any case, the trial court did not err when it imposed restitution to be determined 
by AP&P. Moreover, AP&P's calculation was properly based on the conduct for which 
defendant was convicted and the conduct for which she agreed to pay restitution as part 
of her plea agreement. 
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Defendant concedes that she admitted responsibility for her conduct in all three 
cases that were charged. Br. Appellant at 13. Defendant also concedes that she agreed to 
pay "restitution on all cases." Id; see also R32. Defendant's argument, however, is not 
completely clear. She either argues that the trial court could not legally impose 
restitution for her conduct in uncharged cases or that she agreed to pay restitution only on 
the three charged cases and not on the cases the State agreed not to charge as part of the 
plea agreement. See Br. Appellant at 13. 
1. In 1995, as under current law, the trial court could impose jurisdiction for 
conduct for which the defendant agreed to pay restitution as part of her plea 
agreement. 
If defendant is making a legal argument, i.e., that statutory law permitted 
restitution only for conduct for which the defendant was convicted or for conduct for 
which the defendant admitted responsibility, defendant misreads the law. The 1995 law 
provided: "When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary 
damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the 
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for 
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of the plea 
agreements Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (1995) (emphasis added); cf Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(4)(a) (West 2004). The final clause of the subsection is 
dispositive. A court may order restitution not only for conduct for which a defendant 
admits responsibility, but also for conduct for which she agrees to pay restitution as part 
of the plea agreement. Here, defendant agreed to pay "restitution on all cases." R32. 
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Defendant also claims that "[w]hereas 'complete' restitution might encompass all 
monetary damages caused by a defendant, actual 'court-ordered' restitution was limited 
[in 1995] only to those damages flowing from criminal conduct admitted by the 
defendant." Br. Appellant at 12. Defendant's misstates the law. In 1995, as now, 
complete restitution was defined as "the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(c)(i) (1995); cf Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(a) (West 2004). Then, as now, court-ordered restitution was 
defined as "the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to 
pay as part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(4)(c)(ii) 1995); cf Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(2)(b) (West 2004). Then, as now, 
after determining complete restitution, but before determining court-ordered restitution, 
the trial court was required to consider the financial resources of the defendant, the 
burden that payment of restitution would impose, the ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution, and the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(8)(b) (1995); cf Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(c) 
(West 2004). Thus, the difference between complete and court-ordered restitution is not 
whether defendant admitted responsibility for certain conduct or whether she agreed to 
pay restitution for certain conduct as part of her plea agreement. Rather, the difference is 
simply that the court must consider not only the amount of complete restitution, but also 
the ability of the defendant to pay and the effect of the restitution order on the defendant 
before it imposes court-ordered restitution. 
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In sum, defendant's claim that court-ordered restitution could not be based on 
conduct for which defendant had not admitted responsibility is inconsistent with statutory 
law. Indeed, a court may order restitution that a defendant agrees to pay as part of a plea 
agreement. Clearly, a defendant may agree to pay restitution for conduct she does not 
admit in order to obtain a more favorable plea agreement. 
2. Defendant agreed to pay restitution for losses occasioned by uncharged, as 
well as charged, conduct. 
If defendant is making a factual argument, i.e., that her agreement to pay 
restitution on all cases meant only on all charged cases, her claim is without record 
support. 
First, defendant's claim is inconsistent with the plea agreement. Defendant pled 
guilty to two counts of forgery in case 951901411, based on conduct occurring on July 13 
and 19, 1995. See R40-41; see also District Court Docket (951901411). As its part of 
the plea agreement, the State dismissed three charges of possession of a forged writing in 
that case. See R40-41; see also District Court Docket (951901411). The State also 
dismissed one count of forgery and one count of theft by receiving stolen property in case 
951901412. See R40-41; see also District Court Docket (951901412). The State further 
dismissed two counts of possession of a controlled substance in case 951901413. See 
R40-41; see also District Court Docket (951901413). Finally, the State agreed not to 
bring charges for criminal conduct occurring prior to July 13, 1995. See R32. In 
exchange, defendant agreed to "restitution on all cases." Id. Thus, the plea statement 
evidences defendant's agreement to pay restitution not only for losses occasioned by her 
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charged conduct but also for losses occasioned by conduct the State could have charged, 
but agreed not to charge as part of the plea agreement. 
Second, defendant's current claim is inconsistent with her conduct at the time 
restitution was ordered and calculated. Defendant did not file an objection to the amount 
of restitution and did not request a restitution hearing. She did not appeal the trial court's 
restitution order or the order as modified by AP&P's calculation of the amount. When 
AP&P agent Glade Anderson showed her the documentation showing $17,319.44 owing, 
she told him she thought the amount was "excessive." R152. He told her to "contact her 
defense counsel concerning the restitution issue." Id. She apparently did not. Neither 
did she file any objection to the calculation, ask for a restitution hearing, or appeal the 
restitution order as modified. Rather, she began making restitution payments to AP&P. 
See R67, 68. 
Defendant, in fact, did not complain to the trial court until May 1999, after the 
obligation had been transferred to State Debt Collections. See R67, 68. She then 
informed the court that while she still owed $16,014.14, GC Services, collecting for the 
State, had added interest and fees and assessed her $19,897.12. R68-69. Even then, her 
complaint was not that AP&P's restitution amount was improper or that it was based on 
conduct to which she had not admitted. Rather, her complaint was about interest and 
collection fees. 
Nevertheless, almost ten years after restitution was imposed and calculated, 
defendant would have this Court believe that her agreement to pay restitution on all cases 
meant only on the charged cases and not on the cases the State agreed not to file. See Br. 
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Appellant at 13. Defendant's assertion is inconsistent with the plea agreement and with 
her conduct in the intervening years. Moreover, it is inconsistent with her testimony at 
the 2005 hearing. At that hearing, defendant was asked about her 1995 plea agreement to 
pay restitution. R171:36. Asked whether she had agreed to pay full restitution in all 
cases, including "all counts that had not been filed, everything [she] had done up to that 
point," defendant responded: "I'm sure I signed a paper that stated that, and I'm not 
trying to be obnoxious here. I'm just telling you the truth. I don't remember." R131:37. 
Finally, her claim is inconsistent with the trial court's factual findings. In its 2005 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court received evidence and heard argument on this very 
issue. R171:13-14; Exhibits (in envelope included in record). The trial court found that 
"in exchange for the plea agreement..., defendant was to pay full restitution on all 
counts in all cases and for all other uncharged criminal conduct." R152. Defendant does 
not address this finding or challenge it as clearly erroneous. See Br. Appellant. 
Thus, defendant presents no evidence that she did not agree to pay restitution in all 
cases, charged and uncharged. See id at 13. She does not challenge the trial court's 
2005 finding that she agreed to pay full restitution "on all counts in all cases and for all 
other uncharged criminal conduct." R152. She does not even directly claim that her 
agreement was only to pay restitution in the charged cases. Rather, she appears to claim 
that she could only have legally agreed to pay restitution for admitted conduct. See Br. 
Appellant at 13. That, however, is not the law. As explained, a defendant may be 
ordered to pay restitution for conduct for which she agreed to pay restitution as part of 
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her plea agreement, whether or not she admits responsibility for that conduct. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-201(l)(b) (1995). 
In sum, defendant could have filed an objection to the restitution amount when 
AP&P informed her of that amount. She did not. She did not ask for a restitution 
hearing. She did not appeal the order. She complied. Even now in 2005, she does not 
claim that she did not agree to pay restitution in all cases, including uncharged cases. She 
has not shown that trial court's original order, as reduced to a sum certain by AP&P, was 
improper or statutorily unauthorized. 
Moreover, "[defendants have a responsibility to be vigilant in preserving their 
appeal rights." State v. Verikokides, 925 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1996). Here, defendant 
waited almost a decade before challenging the amount and basis for the 1995/1996 
restitution order. To the extent that original records may no longer be available to 
explain the details underlying AP&P's 1996 restitution calculation, defendant must bear 
responsibility because of her undue delay in challenging restitution. Thus, on appeal, she 
is not entitled to benefit from ambiguities or missing details in the record regarding such 
matters as the number and amount of forged checks presented by Smith's to AP&P in 
1996. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S 2004 MOTIONS TO 
TERMINATE RESTITUTION 
Defendant next claims that "[t]he trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
amended motion for termination of restitution." Br. Appellant at 16. Defendant claims 
19 
that the court "calculate[ed] court-ordered restitution based upon irrelevant and 
conclusory evidence." Id. 
While defendant could not challenge the trial court's original restitution order, she 
could request that the trial court, in its jurisdiction to enforce restitution, clarify or modify 
the restitution order. Construing her motion to terminate restitution as such a request, the 
issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion. 
Controlling law. "Trial courts are vested with wide latitude and discretion in 
sentencing." State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417,f6, 82 P.3d 211 (quoting State v. 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,^ f 63, 52 P.3d 1194) (additional quotation marks and citation 
omitted). This Court "will not disturb a trial court's restitution order unless it exceeds 
that prescribed by law or [unless the trial court] otherwise abused its discretion. Id. 
(citing State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, f 7, 40 P.3d 1143) (additional quotation marks 
and citation omitted). "[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the 
personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it 
can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." 
Id. (citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) (additional quotation marks 
omitted)). 
Analysis. Here, defendant filed a pro se motion to terminate, claiming that despite 
her regular payments she was falling further and further behind due to State Debt 
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Collections assessment of interest and fees.1 R77-73. Thus, her complaint was 
apparently that, in retrospect, the restitution order exceeded her ability to pay. However, 
defendant conceded that she had been paying only $50 a month toward restitution, even 
though she was making between $13,000 and $15,000 a year. R171:40. The trial court 
concluded that these matters did not excuse her from her continuing restitution 
obligation. 
Under the circumstances, the trial court would not have abused its discretion had it 
simply ordered her to pay larger payments so that over time she could retire her 
obligation, including interest and fees assessments. The trial court, however, gave 
defendant a measure of relief. First, the trial court reduced the amount of restitution 
defendant owed to $11,384.14—an amount reflecting the $16,014.44 figure defendant 
conceded she still owed when she wrote to the court in 1999 less the $4,630.00 in 
payments she had already made. Rl 52-53. Thus, the court applied all payments toward 
principal, relieving defendant from any obligation for interest and fees she had been 
charged in the interim. Moreover, the modification used the figure defendant stated that 
she still owed in 1999 and deducted from that figure all payments defendant had made 
from 1995 through 2005. Thus, defendant was not only relieved from interest and fees 
1
 Trial counsel filed an amended motion to terminate restitution. R94. That 
motion gave short shrift to the propriety of a modification, instead attacking the original 
restitution order. See R94-102. In the supporting memorandum, trial counsel did argue 
that "the need to make an order requiring additional restitution payments to Smith's is 
outweighed by the burden such an order would continue to impose on [defendant]." 
R102. 
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that had already accrued, but the amount of restitution was reduced from the $17,319.44 
in the original order to $16, 014.44. Finally, the trial court struck its original $5000 fine. 
Thus, defendant's financial obligations were reduced by the amount of accrued interest 
and fees and by approximately $6300 more.2 
With respect to defendant's future payments, the trial court ruled that while State 
Debt Collections would continue to collect restitution payments, AP&P would monitor 
those payments. Defendant would be responsible for future interest only if her annual 
payments fell below $1200 ($100 per month). 
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that "no reasonable [person]" would 
have denied the motion to terminate restitution. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, j^ 6 (citing 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d at 887 (additional quotation marks omitted)). The trial court, in fact, 
accorded defendant more than fair treatment on her motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
2
 The trial court's calculation may, in fact, have accorded defendant more relief 
than the court actually intended. In an effort to limit argument over the propriety of the 
original restitution amount and to simplify calculations, the trial court simply began its 
calculations with the $16,014.44 figure that defendant said she still owed as of February 
1999, a lesser amount than the original $17,319.44 restitution order. It then reduced the 
$16,014.44 figure by the amount of all restitution defendant had paid from 1995 through 
2004. 
22 
Respectfully submitted this o{X day o 6tAj _, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
B.INOUYE 
stant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
AM*~ft^ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e ^ day of M^S^nluv le^u , 2005,1 either mailed first-
class postage prepaid or hand-delivered two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to 
appellant's counsel of record, as follows: 
JOHN PACE 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
425 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Counsel for Appellant 
VUt/teo> 
ANNE B. INOUYE 






UT ST § 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 3. PUNISHMENTS 
PART 2. SENTENCING 
Copyright © 1953, 1960-1963, 1966, 1968-1971, 1973, 1974, 1976-1978, 
1981, 1982, 1984 by The Allen Smith Company; Copyright © 1986-1994 by 
The Michie Company. Copyright © 1995 by Michie Butterworth, a 
division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All 
Rights Reserved. 
76-3-201 Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — 
Restitution. -- Hearing — Definitions — Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation 
of crimes with mandatory sentences [Effective until April 29, 1996]. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted 
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of 
the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes 
the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and 
losses including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages 
to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured 
damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or 
transportation and as further defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
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to pay a fine; 
to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
to imprisonment; 
to life imprisonment; 
on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
to death, 
a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
i) forfeit property; 
ii) dissolve a corporation; 
iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
v) cite for contempt; or 
vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall 
order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this 
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution 
as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning 
as defined in Section 77-38-2 and family member has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-37-2. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall 
follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the 
court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) 
on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the restitution order is 
entered may seek enforcement of the restitution order in accordance with the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf 
of the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the 
restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution 
and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil 
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process, the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a 
judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as 
a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered 
from the time of sentencing. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of 
criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in 
addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant make 
restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall 
consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution 
and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a 
victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal 
sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined 
as provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or 
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the 
decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, the 
defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of 
court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a 
judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as 
a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered 
from the time of sentencing. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if 
the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the 
state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
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(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to 
appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection 
(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported 
in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of 
three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of 
the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or 
mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement 
identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional 
facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and served 
on the opposing party at least four days prior to the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of 
the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the 
probation officer's report, other reports, including reports received under Section 
76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or 
the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons 
for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and 
committed to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the date of 
commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recommendation of the Board 
of Pardons and Parole, recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and 
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not previously 
been sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than the initial sentence 
nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute. 
(ii) The resentencing shall take into consideration the sentencing guidelines 
established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice 
to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. 
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served. 
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(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its choice of sentence on the 
record at the time of sentencing. 
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the sentence that, 
if the defendant is released from prison, the defendant may be on parole for a 
period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of a 
child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the 
defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set 
forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true 
by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the aggravated 
mandatory term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over any 
conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, 
that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal 
activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct 
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or 
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including 
nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing 
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and 
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a 
result of the offense if the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis 
or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of 
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the 
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under this 
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Addendum B 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. CHRISTI EVERETTE KEELE 
CASE NUMBER 951901411 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 7 6-6-501 - FORGERY 
3rd Degree Felony Plea: October 30, 1995 Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 {Guilty Plea} 
Charge 2 - 76-6-501 - FORGERY 
3rd Degree Felony Plea: October 30, 1995 Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 {Guilty Plea} 
Charge 3 - 7 6-6-502 - POSSESS FORGERY WRITING/DEVICE 
Class A Misdemeanor Plea: October 30, 1995 Not Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 Dismissed 
Charge 4 - 76-6-502 - POSSESS FORGERY WRITING/DEVICE 
Class A Misdemeanor Plea: October 30, 1995 Not Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 Dismissed 
Charge 5 - 7 6-6-502 - POSSESS FORGERY WRITING/DEVICE 
Class A Misdemeanor Plea: October 30, 1995 Not Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
PARTIES 
Also Known As - CHRISTI FELLERS 
Also Known As - CHRISTI ROMERO 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: KENNETH R UPDEGROVE 
Defendant - CHRISTI EVERETTE KEELE 
Notus, ID 83656 
Represented by: RALPH DELLAPIANA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: CHRISTI EVERETTE KEELE 
Offense tracking number: 7558828 
Date of Birth: May 24, 1957 
Social Security Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: SALT LAKE POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 95-100818 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Violation Date: July 13, 1995 
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Balance Payable: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FINE 
Original Amount Due: 1,156.25 
Amended Amount Due: 335.00 
Amount Paid: 335.00 




Jan 30, 2002 -821.25 
State Debt Collection 
Reason 
Adjusted to zero and set to 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 15.00 
Amount Paid: 15.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 





















Trust Description: Attorney Fees 
Recipient: DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
Amount Due: 0.00 
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CASE NUMBER 951901411 State Felony 
Paid In: 0.00 




08-01-95 Judge YOUNG assigned. 
08-01-95 Note: Case filed from Circuit Court bindover. 
08-01-95 Note: ARR scheduled for 8/ 7/95 at 8:30 A in room K 
with DSY 
08-01-95 Information filed 
08-07-95 Arraignment scheduled on August 07, 1995 at 08:30 AM with Judge 
YOUNG. 
08-07-95 DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on August 28, 1995 at 08:30 AM 
with Judge YOUNG. 
08-07-95 Note: Fel Arraignment JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
08-07-95 Note: ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. ATP: HAMP, RICHARD 
08-07-95 Note: Deft is present 
08-07-95 Note: DSP scheduled for 08/28/95 at 0830 A in room K 
with DSY 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-501 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-501 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-502 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-502 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-502 
08-07-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (ARR) DEFT PLED N/G. DISPOSITION SET 
FOR 
08-07-95 Note: 8-28-95 @ 8:30 A.M. 
08-28-95 Warrant ordered on: August 28, 1995 Warrant Num: 952000990 No 
Bail 
08-28-95 Warrant issued on: August 28, 1995 Warrant Num: 952000990 No 
Bail 
Judge: DAVID S YOUNG 
Issue reason: Failure to Appear. 
08-28-95 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
08-28-95 Note: Deft not present 
08-28-95 Note: ATD: MACK, DAVID ATP: COPE, JAMES 
08-28-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (DISP HRG) BASED ON NON-APPEARANCE OF 
THE 
08-28-95 Note: DEFT, COURT ORDERS A NO-BAIL B/W TO ISSUE 
RETURNABLE 
08-28-95 Note: FORTHWITH. 
08-28-95 Note: Warrant ordered 
08-28-95 Note: BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE DSY 
08-28-95 Note: Failure to appear for hearing. 
08-28-95 Note: No bail ordered 
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with Judge YOUNG. 
09-21-95 Warrant recalled on: September 21, 1995 Warrant num: 952000990 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
09-25-95 Warrant ordered on: September 25, 1995 Warrant Num: 952001093 
No Bail 































Failure to Appear 
Hearing (DISPOSITION HEARING): 
Deft not present 
ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. 
FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (DSP HRG) 
JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
ATP: BOYDEN, ANNE 
BASED ON NON-APPEARANCE OF 
COURT ORDERS A NO-BAIL B/W TO ISSUE RETURNABLE 











95 Note: Warrant ordered 
95 Note: BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE DSY 
95 Note: Failure to appear for hearing. 
95 Note: No bail ordered 
95 Warrant recalled on: October 18, 1995 Warrant num: 952001093 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
95 DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on October 30, 1995 at 08:30 AM 
in Third Floor - S35 with Judge YOUNG. 
95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-501 Find: Guilty Plea 
95 Sentencing scheduled on December 11, 1995 at 08:30 AM in Third 
Floor - S35 with Judge YOUNG. 
Change of Plea JUDGE: 
ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. 
Deft is present 
Deft advised of rights 
PSI Ordered from ADULT PROBATION & PAROLE 
Deft enters a plea of guilty to charge(s) 
Court orders counts 3, 4, 5 dismissed 
Court orders cases 951901412, 951901413 dismissed 





















DAVID S. YOUNG 
ATP: BOYDEN, ANN 
01 02 
CUSTODY: County Sheriff 
: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (COP) DEFT PLED GUILTY TO CT 
FORGERY 3RD 
: DGR FELONY (AS CHARGED) CT 3,4,5 ARE DISMISSED. 
REPORT ORDERED AND SENT SET FOR 12-11-95 AT 8:30 
DEFT'S REQUEST TO SET BAIL IS DENIED. 
FILED: APPD REFERRAL FORM 
FILED: STATEMENT OF DEFT 
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10-30-95 Note: Entered case disposition of: Closed 
12-11-95 Fine Account created Total Due: 1156.25 
12-11-95 Trust Account created Total Due: 150.00 
12-11-95 Trust Account created Total Due: 0.00 
12-11-95 Note: Sentence: Judge DAVID S. YOUNG 
12-11-95 Note: REPORTER: CAMPBELL, GAYLE 
12-11-95 Note: Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present 
12-11-95 Note: FINE AMOUNT: 5000.00 SUSPENDED: 
5000.00 
12-11-95 Note: 0 TO 5 YEARS SUSPENDED: 5 YEARS 
12-11-95 Note: Chrg: FORGERY Plea: Guilty Find: 
Guilty Plea 
12-11-95 Note: FINE AMOUNT: 5000.00 SUSPENDED: 
4375.00 
12-11-95 Note: 0 TO 5 YEARS SUSPENDED: 5 YEARS 
12-11-95 Note: THE DEFENDANT IS PLACED ON PROBATION WITH APPD FOR 36 
MONTHS 
12-11-95 Note: CREATE Trust A/R # 01 Attorney Fee 
150.00 
12-11-95 Note: Fines and assessments entered: FS 
625.00 
12-11-95 Note: SB 
531.25 
12-11-95 Note: Total fines and assessments..: 
1156.25 
12-11-95 Note: FILED: ORDER OF RELEASE TO UTAH ALCOHOLISM FOUNDATION'S 
RECOVERY 
12-11-95 Note: CENTER PROGRAM 
12-11-95 Note: Entered case disposition of: Closed 
12-11-95 Note: JUDGMENT - CTS 1 & 2, FORGERY 
12-11-95 Note: 2204730 
12-11-95 Note: DATE: 12-15-95 
12-11-95 Note: TIME: 8:08 AM 
12-11-95 Note: NOTE: SEE FILE 
04-24-96 Order to Show Cause scheduled on April 29, 1996 at 08:30 AM in 
Third Floor - S35 with Judge YOUNG. 
04-25-96 Warrant ordered on: April 25, 1996 Warrant Num: 962000545 No 
Bail 
04-25-96 Warrant issued on: April 25, 1996 Warrant Num: 962000545 No 
Bail 
Judge: DAVID S YOUNG 
Issue reason: The defendant failed to comply with the 
terms of probations as alleged in the Order to Show Cause. 
04-25-96 Note: FILED: APPD/PROGRESS VIOLATION REPORT REQUESTING A NO 
BAIL B/W 
04-25-96 Note: TO ISSUE RETURNABLE FORTHWITH 
04-25-96 Note: FILED: AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF OSC 
04-25-96 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY-THE COURT ORDERS A NO BAIL BENCH 
WARRANT TO 
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04-25-96 Note: ISSUE AND AN OSC HRG BE SCHEDULED FOR 4-29-96 AT 
8:30 A.M 
04-25-96 Note: ISSUED OSC RETURNABLE 4-29-96 AT 8:30 A.M. 
04-25-96 Note: Case disposition removed 
04-25-96 Note: Warrant ordered 
04-25-96 Note: BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE DSY 
04-25-96 Note: Failure to comply with probation. 
04-25-96 Note: No bail ordered 
04-29-96 Order to Show Cause scheduled on May 06, 1996 at 08:30 AM in 
Third Floor - S35 with Judge YOUNG. 
04-29-96 Note: Hearing (ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE): JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
04-29-96 Note: Deft Present 
04-29-96 Note: ATD: PETERSON, MICHAEL ATP: MCCLOSKEY, RUTH 
04-29-96 Note: OSC scheduled for 05/06/96 at 0830 A in room E 
with DSY 
04-29-96 Note: CUSTODY: County Sheriff 
04-29-96 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (OSC) DEFT DENIES THE ALLEGATIONS OF 
THE 
04-29-96 Note: AFFIDAVIT AND OSC. COURT ORDERS THE MATTER IS 
CONTINUED 
04-29-96 Note: TO 5-6-96 @ 8:30 A.M. FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
05-01-96 Warrant recalled on: May 01, 1996 Warrant num: 962000545 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
05-06-96 Note: Hearing (ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE): JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
05-06-96 Note: Deft Present 
05-06-96 Note: ATD: STAM, KAREN ATP: BLAYLOCK, ROGER 
05-06-96 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (OSC) DEFT ADMITS ALLEGATIONS #7,8,9. 
BASED 
05-06-96 Note: ON MOTION OF STATE, #1,2,3,4,5,6. THE DEFT CONTD 
ON 
05-06-96 Note: PROBATION (SEE M.E. FOR DETAILS) 
06-21-96 Fine Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: FINE PAYMENT 
06-21-96 Note: FINE PAYMENT 
07-12-96 Fine Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: FINE PAYMENT 
07-12-96 Note: FINE PAYMENT 
08-05-96 Fine Payment Received: 50.00 
Note: FINE PAYMENT 
08-05-96 Note: FINE PAYMENT 
09-06-96 Fine Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: FINE PAYMENT 
09-06-96 Attorney Fees Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: ATTORNEY FEES 
09-06-96 Note: FINE PAYMENT 
09-16-96 Attorney Fees -25.00 
Note: RETURNED BY BANK 
09-17-96 Note: FILED: LETTER FROM VICKI ALLEN TO WOMENS COMM 
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CORRECTIONAL 
09-17-96 Note: CENTER 
09-19-96 Fine Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: PARTIAL FINE PAYMENT 
09-19-96 Note: PARTIAL FINE PAYMENT 
10-15-96 Fine Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: PARTIAL FINE PAYMENT 
10-15-96 Note: PARTIAL FINE PAYMENT 
12-09-96 Fine Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: FINE PAYMENT 
12-09-96 Note: FINE PAYMENT 
01-06-97 Attorney Fees Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: FINE PAYMENT 
01-28-97 Attorney Fees Check # 2225 Trust Payout: 10.00 
Note: Atty fee pmt from Trust 
02-20-97 Fine Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: FINE PAYMENT 
02-20-97 Note: FINE PAYMENT 
03-19-97 Attorney Fees Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: ATTORNEY'S FEES 
04-16-97 Attorney Fees Check # 2389 Trust Payout: 10.00 
Note: Atty fee pmt from Trust 
04-29-97 Fine NSF Check Reversal: -25.00 
Note: RETURNED BY BANK 
04-29-97 Fine Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: REDEPOSITED 10/07/96 (TO TRUST) 
04-29-97 Attorney Fees Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: REDEPOSITED 10/07/96 
04-29-97 Note: REDEPOSITED 10/07/96 (TO TRUST) 
05-21-97 Attorney Fees Check # 2542 Trust Payout: 25.00 
Note: Atty fee pmt from Trust 
07-08-97 Attorney Fees Payment Received: 20.00 
Note: PARITIAL PAYMENT 
07-14-97 Review Hearing scheduled on August 11, 1997 at 08:30 AM in 
Third Floor - S35 with Judge YOUNG. 
08-08-97 Attorney Fees Check # 2826 Trust Payout: 20.00 
Note: Atty fee pmt from Trust 
08-11-97 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY-INFORMAL SUPERVISION TO CONTINUE 
THROUGH 
08-11-97 Note: APPD IN UTAH 
09-25-97 Fine Payment Received: 10.00 
Note: FINE PAYMENT 
09-25-97 Note: FINE PAYMENT 
12-15-97 Filed: progress/violation report - signed and approved 
01-30-98 Attorney Fees Payment Received: 50.00 
Note: Mail Payment 
02-27-98 Fine Payment Received: 50.00 
Note: Mail Payment 
02-27-98 Fine Payment Reversal: -50.00 
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Note: Clerk Error - will re-enter 
02-27-98 Fine Payment Received: 15.00 
Note: Mail Payment 
02-27-98 Attorney Fees Payment Received: 35.00 
03-26-98 Fine Payment Received: 50.00 
04-30-98 Fine Payment Received: 50.00 
Note: Mail Payment 
06-11-98 Attorney Fees Check # 5280 Trust Payout: 85.00 
09-25-98 Filed: Letter to DSY asking for a referance letter (from def 
Christi Keele aka Herrera) 
05-13-99 Filed: Letter from defendant. Per DSY- set for OSC hearing re 
restitution 
05-20-99 Notice - NOTICE for Case 951901411 ID 342498 
COURT1S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled. 
Date: 06/11/1999 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 
This matter is scheduled at the direction of the Court for order to 
show cause re status of restitution payments re defendant's motion 
for review. 
05-20-99 COURT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on June 11, 1999 at 08:30 
AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge YOUNG. 
06-11-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORDER 
Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 
PRESENT 
Clerk: taunah 
Prosecutor: MERCER, STEPHEN 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
Video 
Tape Number: 061199 Tape Count: 9:51-9:01 
HEARING 
Defendant motions that restitution be returned from collections 
and be monitered by AP&P. She states she is currently paying 
$50.00 a month towards restitution and payments are current. 
Further she states that the Court 
previously ordered that the restitution be paid before the Court 
fines are paid. 
The Court grants defendant's motion and orders restitution be 
returned from collections to AP&P to monitor collection of 
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restitution. Jim Fransen, AP&P agent, is present at this hearing. 
Defendant is to contact Mr. Fransen. 
The defendant is ordered to pay the restitution before paying the 
balance of the Court fine. 
06-14-99 Filed order: Order 
Judge dyoung 
Signed June 14, 1999 
07-20-99 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY-ORDER 
Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 
Clerk: uman 
HEARING 
After further examination, the Court is unable to retake 
supervision of further fine payments. Supervision will remain with 
GC services. 
This signed minute entry shall serve as the Order of the Court. 
C.C.to Counsel. 
07-20-99 Filed order: Order (supervision will remain with GC Services) 
Judge dyoung 
Signed July 20, 1999 
01-30-02 Note: Case sent to State Debt Collection 
01-30-02 Judgment #1 Entered 
Creditor: STATE OF UTAH 
Debtor: CHRISTI EVERETTE KEELE 
821.25 Fine 
821.25 Judgment Grand Total 
06-29-04 Filed: Motion to Terminate Restitution 
07-21-04 Filed: STATEfS RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS MOTION TO TERMINATE 
RESTITUTION 
07-26-04 Judge HIMONAS assigned. 
07-26-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 951901411 ID 6009573 
MOTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 08/16/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
Defendant's motion to teminate restitution is set for hearing. 
07-26-04 MOTION HEARING scheduled on August 16, 2004 at 08:30 AM in 
Third Floor - W35 with Judge HIMONAS. 
08-16-04 LAW AND MOTION scheduled on October 18, 2004 at 08:30 AM in 
Third Floor - W35 with Judge HIMONAS. 
08-16-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
PRESENT 
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Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: DALESANDRO, NICK 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 1007 
HEARING 
TAPE: video COUNT: 1007 
On record the Defense would like to provide information that the 
court still has jurisdiction over the case. 
LAW AND MOTION. 
Date: 10/18/2004 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
09-10-04 Filed: Amended Motion to Terminate Restitution 
10-13-04 Filed: Transcript of hearing dated 1-11-1995, Gayle B. 
Campbell, Court Reporter 
10-18-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING 
Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Prosecutor: COLLINS, CHOU CHOU 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH 
Video 
Tape Number: 12:01 
HEARING 
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for hearing on 
defendant's motion to terminate restitution. The Court hears 
argument from respective counsel and sets this matter for an 
evidentary hearing on December 6, 2004 at 1:30 p.m. 
RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 12/06/2004 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS 
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10-18-04 RESTITUTION HEARING scheduled on December 06, 2004 at 01:30 PM 
in Third Floor - W35 with Judge KENNEDY. 
11-01-04 Judge KENNEDY assigned. 
12-06-04 RESTITUTION HEARING scheduled on January 26, 2005 at 08:30 AM 
in Third Floor - W35 with Judge KENNEDY. 
12-06-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for Restitution Hearing 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Prosecutor: UPDEGROVE, KENNETH R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH 
Video 
Tape Number: 2:30 
HEARING 
The above-entitled case comes before the Court for hearing on 
restitution. Based on discussions, this matter is continued to 
January 26, 2005 at 8:30 a.m. Counsel shall obtain records from 
APPD and State Debt prior to that hearing. 
RESTITUTION HEARING. 
Date: 01/26/2005 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
01-12-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
01-12-05 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
01-26-05 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on July 18, 2005 at 10:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - W4 7 with Judge HENRIOD. 
01-26-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Restitution Hearing 
Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Prosecutor: UPDEGROVE, KENNETH R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH 
Video 
Tape Number: 8:43 
HEARING 
TAPE: 8:43 The above-entitled case comes before the Court for 
restitution hearing. The Court hears opening statements from 
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respective counsel. 
TAPE: 8:57 The State calls Glade Anderson who is sworn and 
examined. 
TAPE: 9:10 Robert Johnson is sworn and examined. 
TAPE: 9:21 The State rests. Defendant calls Christi Keele who is 
sworn and examined. 
TAPE: 9:50 Defendant rests. Both sides rest. The Court hears 
argument from respective counsel. Based on the evidence and 
argument of counsel, the Court finds as of February 1999, defendant 
owed $16,014.14. The Court credits $4630 for amounts paid. 
Accordingly, defendant is ordered to pay $11384.14 plus the fine, 
however the Court will cancel the fine. Defendant is ordered to 
pay recoupment. If defendant pays at least $100 per month, she 
will not have to pay interest on the principal amount. If 
she pays less, defendant will pay interest. The Courts orders 
APPD to monitor the payments, but the payments will go to State 
Debt. Mr. Updegrove is instructed to prepare an order consistent 
with the Court!s ruling. 
This matter is set for further review on July 18, 2005 at 10:00 
a .m. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 07/18/2005 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W35 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
01-26-05 Filed: Exhibits 
01-26-05 Filed: Exhibit List 
01-31-05 Judge HENRIOD assigned. 
02-07-05 Filed order: Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law on 
Defendant's Motion to Terminate Restitution 
Judge shenriod 
Signed February 07, 2005 
02-07-05 Filed order: Order on Defendant's Motion to Terminate 
Restitution 
Judge shenriod 
Signed February 07, 2005 
02-10-05 Note: **Copy of minutes entry regarding restitution sent to 
AP&P. 
02-14-05 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
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02-14-05 Filed: Designation of Record, Certificate, Request for 
Transcript 
02-15-05 Note: Forwarded Cert/Copies of Notice of Appeal, Designation of 
Record, Certificate, Request for Transcript to Court of Appeals 
02-17-05 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
02-17-05 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
02-18-05 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals - Noa received, Cout of 
Appeals No. 20050154-ca 
03-07-05 Filed: Transcript of restitution hearing dated 1-26-05, Beverly 
Lowe, CCT 
03-07-05 Filed: Notice of Filing Transcript of restitution hearing dated 
1-26-05, Beverly Lowe, CCT 
03-14-05 Note: Cert/Copy of Index Forwarded to Court of Appeals 
03-14-05 Note: Cert/Copy of Judgment, Sentence, Commitment forwarded to 
Court of Appeals 
03-14-05 Note: Record Forwarded to Court of Appeals - 20050154-Ca - File 
- 1, Tran - 2, Exhibits - 1 manilla envelope 
07-18-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
PRESENT 
Clerk: lynm 
Prosecutor: PLATT, CHAD L 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DELLAPIANA, RALPH 
Audio 
Tape Number: 18b Tape Count: 1119 
HEARING 
TAPE: 18b COUNT: 1119 
On record the defendant was not present. The defendant is ordered 
to continue paying. Adult Probation and Parole is released from 
monitoring and their interest is closed. A review date was set for 
December 5, 2005 @ 10:00 a.m. 
REVIEW HEARING. 
Date: 12/05/2005 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - W47 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
07-18-05 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on December 05, 2005 at 10:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - W47 with Judge HENRIOD. 
07-18-05 Note: REVIEW HEARING minutes modified. 
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Addendum C 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. CHRISTI E KEELE 
CASE NUMBER 951901412 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-6-501 - FORGERY 
3rd Degree Felony Plea: August 07, 1995 Not Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 Dismissed 
Charge 2 - 7 6-6-408 - THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY 
Class B Misdemeanor Plea: August 07, 1995 Not Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
DAVID S YOUNG 
PARTIES 
Defendant - CHRISTI E KEELE 
Represented by: PAUL C QUINLAN 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: KENNETH R UPDEGROVE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: CHRISTI E KEELE 
Offense tracking number: 7519184 
Date of Birth: May 24, 1957 
Law Enforcement Agency: WEST VALLEY POLICE 
LEA Case Number: 95-26475 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 




08-01-95 Information filed 
08-01-95 Judge YOUNG assigned. 
08-01-95 Note: Case filed from Circuit Court bindover. 
08-01-95 Note: ARR scheduled for 8/ 7/95 at 8:30 A in room K 
with DSY 
08-07-95 Arraignment scheduled on August 07, 1995 at 08:30 AM with Judge 
YOUNG. 
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08-07-95 DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on August 28, 1995 at 08:30 AM 
with Judge YOUNG. 
08-07-95 Note: Fel Arraignment JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
08-07-95 Note: ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. ATP: HAMP, RICHARD 
08-07-95 Note: Deft is present 
08-07-95 Note: DSP scheduled for 08/28/95 at 0830 A in room K 
with DSY 
08-07-95 Note: CUSTODY: Bail Continued 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-501 Plea: Not Guilty 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-408 Plea: Not Guilty 
08-07-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (ARR) DEFT PLED N/G. DISPOSITION SET 
FOR 
08-07-95 Note: 8-28-95 0 8:30 A.M. 
08-28-95 Warrant ordered on: August 28, 1995 Warrant Num: 952000991 No 
Bail 
08-28-95 Warrant issued on: August 28, 1995 Warrant Num: 952000991 No 
Bail 
Judge: DAVID S YOUNG 
Issue reason: Failure to Appear. 
08-28-95 Note: Hearing: JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
08-28-95 Note: Deft not present 
08-28-95 Note: ATD: MACK, DAVID ATP: COPE, JAMES 
08-28-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (DISP HRG) BASED ON THE 
NON-APPEARANCE OF 
08-28-95 Note: THE DEFT, COURT ORDERS A NO-BAIL B/W TO ISSUE 
RETURNABLE 
08-28-95 Note: FORTHWITH. 
08-28-95 Note: Warrant ordered 
08-28-95 Note: BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE DSY 
08-28-95 Note: Failure to appear for hearing. 
08-28-95 Note: No bail ordered 
09-15-95 DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on September 25, 1995 at 08:30 AM 
with Judge YOUNG. 
09-21-95 Warrant recalled on: September 21, 1995 Warrant num: 952000991 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
09-25-95 Warrant ordered on: September 25, 1995 Warrant Num: 952001094 
No Bail 
09-25-95 Warrant issued on: September 25, 1995 Warrant Num: 952001094 No 
Bail 
Judge: DAVID S YOUNG 
Issue reason: Failure to Appear. 
09-25-95 Note: Hearing (DISPOSITION HEARING): JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
09-25-95 Note: Deft not present 
09-25-95 Note: ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. ATP: UPDEGROVE, 
KENNETH R 
09-25-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (DSP HRG) BASED ON NON-APPEARANCE OF 
DEFT 
09-25-95 Note: COURT ORDERS A NO-BAIL B/W TO ISSUE RETURNABLE 
Printed: 08/11/05 07:46:45 Page 2 
CASE NUMBER 951901412 State Felony 
FORTHWITH 
09-25-95 Note: Warrant ordered 
09-25-95 Note: BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE DSY 
09-25-95 Note: Failure to appear for hearing. 
09-25-95 Note: No bail ordered 
10-18-95 Warrant recalled on: October 18, 1995 Warrant num: 952001094 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
10-20-95 DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on October 30, 1995 at 08:30 AM 
in Third Floor - S35 with Judge YOUNG. 
10-30-95 Note: Hearing (DISPOSITION HEARING): JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
10-30-95 Note: Deft Present 
10-30-95 Note: ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. ATP: UPDEGROVE, 
KENNETH R 
10-30-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (DSP) THE CASE IS DISMISSED BASED ON 
DEFT'S 
10-30-95 Note: PLEA OF GUILTY IN CASE #951901411. DEFT RELEASED 
FROM 
10-30-95 Note: JAIL REGARDING THIS CASE 
10-30-95 Note: Entered case disposition of: Closed 
10-30-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-501 Find: Dismissed 
10-30-95 Note: Chrg: 76-6-408 Find: Dismissed 
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Addendum D 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. CHRISTI E KEELE 
CASE NUMBER 951901413 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 58-37-8.12 - POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
Attributes: Drug Schedule 2. 
3rd Degree Felony Plea: August 07, 1995 Not Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 Dismissed 
Charge 2 - 58-37A-5 - POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
Class B Misdemeanor Plea: August 07, 1995 Not Guilty 
Disposition: October 30, 1995 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
DAVID S YOUNG 
PARTIES 
Defendant - CHRISTI E KEELE 
SLC, UT 84117 
Represented by: PAUL C QUINLAN 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: KENNETH R UPDEGROVE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: CHRISTI E KEELE 
Offense tracking number: 
Date of Birth: May 24, 1957 
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY SHERIFF 
LEA Case Number: 94-142365 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 




08-01-95 Information filed 
08-01-95 Judge YOUNG assigned. 
08-01-95 Note: Case filed from Circuit Court bindover. 
08-01-95 Note: ARR scheduled for 8/ 7/95 at 8:30 A in room K 
with DSY 
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CASE NUMBER 951901413 State Felony 
08-07-95 Arraignment scheduled on August 07, 1995 at 08:30 AM with Judge 
YOUNG. 
08-07-95 DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on August 28, 1995 at 08:30 AM 
with Judge YOUNG. 
08-07-95 Note: Fel Arraignment JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
08-07-95 Note: ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. ATP: HAMP, RICHARD 
08-07-95 Note: Deft is present 
08-07-95 Note: DSP scheduled for 08/28/95 at 0830 A in room K 
with DSY 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 58-37-8.12 Plea: Not Guilty 
08-07-95 Note: Chrg: 58-37A-5 Plea: Not Guilty 
08-07-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (ARR) DEFT PLED N/G. DISPOSTION SET 
FOR 
08-07-95 Note: 8-28-95 @ 8:30 A.M. 
08-28-95 Warrant ordered on: August 28, 1995 Warrant Num: 952000992 No 
Bail 
08-28-95 Warrant issued on: August 28, 1995 Warrant Num: 952000992 No 
Bail 
Judge: DAVID S YOUNG 
Issue reason: Failure to Appear. 
08-28-95 Note: Hearing:, JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
08-28-95 Note: Deft not present 
08-28-95 Note: ATD: MACK, DAVID ATP: COPE, JAMES 
08-28-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (DISP HRG) BASED ON THE 
NON-APPEARANCE OF 
08-28-95 Note: THE DEFT, COURT ORDERS A NO-BAIL B/W TO ISSUE 
RETURNABLE 
08-28-95 Note: FORTHWITH. 
08-28-95 Note: Warrant ordered 
08-28-95 Note: BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE DSY 
08-28-95 Note: Failure to appear for hearing. 
08-28-95 Note: No bail ordered 
09-15-95 DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on September 25, 1995 at 08:30 AM 
with Judge YOUNG. 
09-21-95 Warrant recalled on: September 21, 1995 Warrant num: 952000992 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
09-25-95 Warrant ordered on: September 25, 1995 Warrant Num: 952001095 
No Bail 
09-25-95 Warrant issued on: September 25, 1995 Warrant Num: 952001095 No 
Bail 
Judge: DAVID S YOUNG 
Issue reason: Failure to Appear. 
09-25-95 Note: Hearing (DISPOSITION HEARING): JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
09-25-95 Note: Deft not present 
09-25-95 Note: ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. ATP: BOYDEN, ANNE 
09-25-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (DSP HRG) BASED ON NON-APPEARANCE OF 
DEFT 
09-25-95 Note: COURT ORDERS A NO-BAIL B/W TO ISSUE RETURNABLE 
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FORTHWITH 
09-25-95 Note: Warrant ordered 
09-25-95 Note: BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE DSY 
09-25-95 Note: Failure to appear for hearing. 
09-25-95 Note: No bail ordered 
10-18-95 Warrant recalled on: October 18, 1995 Warrant num: 952001095 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
10-20-95 DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on October 30, 1995 at 08:30 AM 
in Third Floor - S35 with Judge YOUNG. 
10-30-95 Note: Hearing (DISPOSITION HEARING): JUDGE: DAVID S. YOUNG 
10-30-95 Note: Deft not present 
10-30-95 Note: ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C. ATP: BOYDEN, ANN 
10-30-95 Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY (DSP) THE CASE IS DISMISSED BASED ON 
DEFT'S 
10-30-95 Note: PLEA OF GUILTY IN CASE #951901411. DEFT RELEASED 
FROM 
10-30-95 Note: JAIL REGARDING THIS CASE 
10-30-95 Note: Chrg: 58-37-8.12 Find: Dismissed 
10-30-95 Note: Chrg: 58-37A-5 Find: Dismissed 
10-30-95 Note: Entered case disposition of: Closed 
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